

Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-25

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DRAFTED BY ACDA/IR/REG:RSTRAND:CF

APPROVED BY ACDA/D:LSLOSS

PM:EIFFT

EUR/RPM:JHAWES

JCS:JGRANGER

ACDA/IR/REG:MHUMPHREYS

DOD/ISA:JKANGAS

S/S:MR. SEBASTIAN

ACDA/D/SALT:PWOLFOWITZ

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USMISSION NATO

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PARM, SALT, GW

SUBJECT:US-FRG ARMS CONTROL BILATERALS: SALT

REF: STATE 066227 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY. SALT DISCUSSION WAS DEVOTED PRIMARILY TO
CRUISE MISSILES. GERMANS SAID THEY SEE CRUISE MISSILE AS
A WEAPON WITH GREAT DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL WHOSE DISPOSITION
IN SALT IS A MATTER OF SERIOUS AND LEGITIMATE CONCERN TO

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THE NATO ALLIES. THEY SAID THEY HOPED SALT WOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO FORECLOSE THEATER OPTIONS UNTIL NATO HAS HAD A
CHANCE TO CONDUCT A CAREFUL REVIEW OF CRUISE MISSILE APPLI-
CATIONS. THEY WARMLY WELCOMED PRESIDENT CARTER'S SUGGESTION
OF DEFERRING CRUISE MISSILE ISSUE (AND BACKFIRE ALSO) TO
SALT III, SINCE THIS WOULD ALLOW TIME FOR SUCH A STUDY.
END SUMMARY.

2. US AND FRG REPS DISCUSSED SALT MARCH 17 AS PART OF TWO-DAY REVIEW OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. FRG PARTICIPANTS WERE LED BY ARMS CONTROL COMMISSIONER RUTH AND INCLUDED LT. COL. SCHREIBER OF MOD POL/MIL STAFF, LT. COL. SCHOTT OF MOD POLICY PLANNING STAFF AND HAUSER AND ANDREA OF FONMIN. US SIDE WAS LED BY ACDA ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR SLOSS AND INCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES OF PM, EUR/RPM, DOD/ISA AND JCS.

3. SLOSS SAID PRESIDENT CARTER HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHAT POSITIONS SECRETARY VANCE WOULD TAKE TO MOSCOW. DECISIONS ABOUT A NEGOTIATING STANCE WOULD BE MADE SHORTLY. SECRETARY VANCE WOULD BE ABLE TO SAY MORE ABOUT THIS WHEN HE VISITED NATO ON HIS WAY TO MOSCOW.

4. SLOSS THEN REVIEWED AT LENGTH THE DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN US THINKING ABOUT PRINCIPAL ISSUES OUTSTANDING IN SALT: REDUCTIONS, BACKFIRE, CRUISE MISSILES, MOBILE MISSILES, FBS, AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION/NON-TRANSFER. HE REITERATED U.S. INTENTION TO OPPOSE REOPENING FBS ISSUE IN SALT II AND US PLEDGE TO CONSULT WITH ALLIES BEFORE MAKING ANY PROPOSAL ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OR NON-TRANSFER. (SLOSS' SPEAKING NOTES SENT REFTEL.)

5. RUTH SAID SLOSS' EXTENSIVE BRIEFING AND ADMINISTRATIONS PLANS TO SEND GELB AND SECRETARY VANCE TO BRIEF NAC ON SALT WERE COMFORTING SIGNS OF IMPORTANCE U.S. ATTACHED TO ITS ALLIANCE TIES. HE SAID CRUISE MISSILES AND SOVIET SS-X-20 WERE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO NATO'S DETERRENCE STRATEGY;
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THIS GAVE THE ALLIES A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN THE OUTCOME OF SALT ABOVE AND BEYOND THEIR INTEREST IN HOW THE NEGOTIATIONS DEALT WITH PURE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THIS INTEREST INCLUDED THE ISSUES OF NON-TRANSFER AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION.

6. RUTH WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT ALTHOUGH THE DISPOSITION OF CRUISE MISSILES IN SALT WOULD AFFECT THE ALLIANCE'S DETERRENT POSTURE AND FUTURE OPTIONS, CRUISE MISSILES HAD NOT REALLY BEEN STUDIED IN NATO. SUCH A STUDY WAS NEEDED.

7. RUTH AND OTHER GERMAN REPS THEN ASKED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS, WHICH US REPS ANSWERED AT LENGTH, ABOUT CRUISE MISSILE MISSIONS, VULNERABILITY, DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULES, AND DEEP INTERDICTION CAPABILITY AGAINST HARD TARGETS, SUCH AS BRIDGES. SLOSS CAUTIONED THAT WHILE IT WAS EASY TO ENUMERATE POSSIBLE ROLES, IT WAS MUCH HARDER TO EVALUATE HOW USEFUL CRUISE MISSILES WOULD BE IN EACH OF THEM. HE SAID THAT LONG-RANGE GLCMS COULD GIVE NATO A THEATER

CAPABILITY WHICH IT DOES NOT HAVE NOW; BUT IN CONSIDERING THIS IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT WHATEVER MISSIONS CRUISE MISSILES COULD PERFORM FOR ALLIES THEY WOULD EVENTUALLY BE ABLE TO PERFORM FOR SOVIETS AS WELL.

8. RUTH SAID THE GLCM OPTION HAD A BEARING ON MBFR. SLOSS AGREED THAT IF WE SOUGHT TO KEEP OPEN A GLCM OPTION IN THE NGA, THE SOVIETS COULD ACCUSE US OF TRYING TO CIRCUMVENT THE LIMITS ON NUMBERS OF U.S. NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WE HAVE PROPOSED IN OPTION III. WE WOULD HAVE TO REPLY THAT OPTION III LIMITS APPLY ONLY TO THE SYSTEMS THE OPTION SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSES.

9. RUTH SAID GLCM ISSUE ALSO LED BACK TO QUESTION OF FBS. SLOSS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LIMITS WHICH WOULD TAKE AWAY CRUISE MISSILE THEATER OPTIONS WOULD BRING FBS BACK INTO SALT THROUGH THE BACK DOOR. HE SAID THE CRITICAL QUESTION
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WAS WHAT IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THESE THEATER OPTIONS; HE SAID THE USG'S STUDIES WERE FAR FROM COMPLETE.

10. SLOSS ASKED WHAT CRUISE MISSILE ROLES WOULD BE OF INTEREST TO THE FRG. RUTH REPLIED THAT THE FRG SAW CRUISE MISSILES AS A WEAPONS SYSTEM WITH GREAT DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL; CONVENTIONALLY ARMED CRUISE MISSILES WOULD INTEREST THE GERMANS IN PARTICULAR. HE SAID THE SOVIET SS-X-20 MOBILE MISSILE, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, WAS A CAUSE FOR GREAT PUBLIC CONCERN IN EUROPE. IT RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER NATO'S DETERRENT WAS STILL CONVINCING. THIS WAS A POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCERN WHICH HAD TO BE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF. CRUISE MISSILES, HOWEVER, REPRESENTED A PROMISING POSSIBLE NEW WEAPONS SYSTEM ON NATO'S SIDE. AS A POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN NATO'S SECURITY THEY COULD REPRESENT A MAJOR U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY THAT WOULD BE OF POLITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

11. RUTH RECALLED PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT SUGGESTING POSSIBILITY OF A BAN ON MOBILES WHICH WOULD INCLUDE SS-X-20. SLOSS SAID HE FEARED THAT TRYING TO GET A HANDLE ON THE SS-X-20 IN SALT COULD REOPEN FBS. THIS RAISED QUESTION OF WHETHER WE WANT TO DEAL WITH THEATER SYSTEMS IN SALT II OR IN FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS. SLOSS SAID IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT ALTHOUGH THE SS-X-20 REPRESENTED AN INCREASED THREAT TO EUROPE, WEST'S COUNTER TO SOVIET IRBMS -- I.E., SACEUR-TARGETED SLBMS -- HAD GROWN TOO.

12. SCHREIBER NOTED THAT CRUISE MISSILES AND BACKFIRE HAD BEEN JUXTAPOSED IN NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID FRG SAW

CRUISE MISSILES AS THE SYSTEM WITH MUCH THE GREATER
POTENTIAL OF THE TWO, NOT TO BE TRADED FOR BACKFIRE. SLOSS
SAID LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TWO HAD BEEN MORE HISTORICAL THAN
FUNCTIONAL. EACH WAS SOMETHING ONE SIDE WISHED TO KEEP
OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. AT FIRST GLANCE, CRUISE MISSILES
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MIGHT APPEAR AS A QUALITATIVELY NEW WEAPONS SYSTEM FOR US,
WHILE BACKFIRE WAS ONLY AN INCREMENTAL CAPABILITY FOR
SOVIETS. BUT THIS IGNORED THE THREAT -- TO SEA LANES IF
NOT TO CONTINENTAL EUROPE -- WHICH MIGHT COME WITH SOVIET
DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOPHISTICATED CRUISE
MISSILES.

13. SLOSS SAID THE BRITISH, LIKE THE GERMANS, HAD CALLED
ATTENTION TO NEED FOR NATO STUDY OF CRUISE MISSILES. WHILE
THIS WAS CLEARLY INDICATED, TIMING PRESENTED A PROBLEM.
WITH MULTITUDE OF UNCERTAINTIES WHICH REMAIN ABOUT CRUISE
MISSILES, IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT A NATO STUDY COULD
ACCOMPLISH BEFORE OCTOBER SALT DEADLINE. RUTH SAID IT
WOULD BE POLITICALLY BENEFICIAL IN ANY CASE. SLOSS
WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT NOT CAUSE FRUSTRATION IF THE
PACE OF THE STUDY FELL BEHIND THAT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

14. HAUSER NOTED PROBLEM OF TNF OBSOLESCENCE AND SAID
GLCMS MIGHT HAVE IMPORTANT APPLICATIONS AS REPLACEMENT
FOR OUTMODED SYSTEMS. HE SAID EUROPEANS WANTED TO KEEP
OPEN CRUISE MISSILE THEATER OPTIONS.

15. SCHREIBER ASKED ABOUT THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION. SLOSS
SAID THAT WITHIN USG MOST FEEL NEED TO PROTECT AN ALCM
OPTION, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN BOMBER PENETRATION CAPABILITY
IN THE FACE OF EXPECTED FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET AIR
DEFENSES; THE SOVIETS SEEM PREPARED TO ACCEPT ALCMS WITH
SOME LIMITS. BEYOND ALCMS, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT WE WANT
TO PROTECT AND WHAT THEY WILL AGREE TO. THEIR PROPOSAL
THAT OTHER CRUISE MISSILES BE LIMITED TO 600 KM HAS NOT
REALLY BEEN TESTED.

16. ANDREAE ASKED IF U.S. HAD CONSIDERED POSSIBILITY OF
BANNING CRUISE MISSILES COMPLETELY. U.S. REPS NOTED
PROBLEMS THIS WOULD POSE FOR HANDLING OF EXISTING SOVIET
CRUISE MISSILES AND OTHER SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS SUCH
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AS SRAM AND SIDEWINDER; THEY SAID ABOUT 300 KM WOULD BE

LOWEST LIMIT PRACTICABLE.

17. SUMMING UP FOR GERMANS, RUTH SAID THAT IF HE WERE
ASKED HIS PREFERENCE REGARDING SALT OUTCOME, HE WOULD SAY
THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO REACH AN AGREEMENT BY OCTOBER;
THAT TO DO THIS IT WOULD BE WISE TO DEFER CRUISE MISSILE
AND BACKFIRE ISSUES, AS PRESIDENT CARTER HAS SUGGESTED;
THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN A WAY WHICH RETAINS ALL THEATER
OPTIONS FOR CRUISE MISSILES; AND THAT U.S. SHOULD THEN
INVITE THE ALLIANCE TO STUDY CAREFULLY THE IMPLICATIONS OF
THIS NEW WEAPONS SYSTEM AND ITS RELATION TO ARMS CONTROL.

CHRISTOPHER

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